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Abstract
The United States and Germany are widely seen as the developed worlds’ two preeminent
economic superpowers, yet the two countries modes of corporate governance are
drastically different. These differences are reflected in corporate board structure, which
we analyze below. The “Anglo-American” model of a one-tier board structure is largely
a reflection of the neo-liberal norms of shareholder primacy and free market capitalism.
The German two-tier model is in many ways a reflection of stakeholder primacy,
codetermination and managerialism. Despite substantial differences in size, structure,
composition, norms and duties, there has been an increasing convergence in certain
board functions, which we analyze in this paper. Our Paper is broken into four parts: (1)
an analysis of the American Corporate Board, (2) an analysis of the German Corporate
Boards, (3) a comparison of the differences in the two systems and (4) an analysis of the
convergence of international corporate governance norms reflected in both systems.
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I. The American Corporate Board
1.1 Composition
Corporate boards in the United States are “one-tier” boards3. This one-tier board
invests both managerial and supervisory responsibilities in one unified board of directors.
This single board is traditionally divided between the (1) Chief Executive Officer
(“CEO”) and executives directors, (2) a Chairman or Lead Director (often times the
CEO) and (3) Independent Directors.4 The CEO or chief executive is now commonly the
only executive on the board as a result of the movement towards independent boards and
independent board committees. The other executives, such as the CFO, COO or CLO
may report directly to the board, but normally are not members of the board. The norm on
American boards is for the CEO to serve as the sole representation of the company’s
executives. Roughly 50% of boards also have a separate chairman of the board, while the
remaining 50% have designated their CEO as both CEO and chairman.5 Within the 50%
that have two separate offices, the U.S. chairman generally has a wide variety of roles
including leading the board meetings and ensuring orderly succession for the CEO.
Finally, the remaining board members have largely become independent directors 6 .
Willem Calkoen describes independent directors as maintaining two roles: (1) to actively
challenge strategy proposed and executed by the officers of the company and (2) to
monitor the execution of the business.7 In order for a director to be independent, under
New York Stock Exchange (herein the “NYSE”) rules they must have “no material
relationship with the listed company.” 8 Case law such as Oracle Corp in the Delaware

3

“One-tier” boards will also be referred to interchangeably throughout this paper as “unitary” boards or
“single-tier” boards
4
Willem J.L Calkoen, The One-Tier Board in the Changing and Converging World of Corporate
Governance at 187-200 (Kluwer et. al. 2012)
5
2015 Spencer Stuart Board Index, Spencer Stuart (November 2015) at 13
6
The rise of the independent director has been meteoric; in 1950 only 20% of directors could be deemed
independent, but by 2005 that number was 75% and by 2015 that number was 84% of the Fortune 500.
Only roughly 50% of publicly traded companies, however, have a separate CEO and Chairman of the
board, but that trend will likely continue to expand as long as shareholders continue to demand separation
of the two roles. See Calkoen at 200; Spencer Stuart at 12; See Generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005:Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59
Stan. L. R. 1467 (2007) (chronicling the rise of independent directors in Corporate America) (We discuss
the rise of independent directors more in depth in Part III of this paper)
7
See Calkoen at 200
8
NYSE 303A.02

6

Court of Chancery has furthered heightened the standard of who is independent.9 The
independent director must also have time for the job, a wide array of knowledge and
experience, and should not have too many other board positions. Most executives are
limited to no more than three other directorships.10

1.2 Size
The boards of most listed companies have between eight and twelve board
members, with the average board size on the S&P 500 being 10.8 11 members. The
general consensus amongst both academics and practitioners is that “[b]oards need to be
large enough to accommodate the necessary skill sets and competences, but still be small
enough to promote cohesion, flexibility and effective participation.” 12 The venerable
corporate lawyer Martin Lipton has argued that “a smaller board will be most likely to
allow directors to get to know each other well, to have more effective discussions with all
directors contributing, and to reach a true consensus from their deliberations.”13 Lipton &
Lorsch have argued that this ideal size should be no more than ten directors (while
favoring eight or nine). 14 American shareholders and management seem to generally
agree with Lipton, as American boards are much smaller than their German
counterparts. 15 The expanding importance of specialized knowledge on committees,
however, may require increasingly larger American boards, which we discuss in Part IV.

1.3 Board Demographics
Spencer Stuarts’ 2015 Board index highlights the current demographics of
Corporate America. First, within the S&P 500 listed companies, almost half of boards

9
In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 2003 WL 21396449 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2003) (finding that a
directors’ independence can be compromised by personal relationships such as school ties)
10
See Generally ISS, Director Overboarding (US) available at:
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/us-overboarding.pdf; General Motors Corporation, Governance
and Corporate Responsibility Committee Charter (December 2015) available at:
https://www.gm.com/content/dam/gm/en_us/english/Group4/InvestorsPDFDocuments/GCRC.pdf ; 2015
Spencer Stuart Board Index, Spencer Stuart (November 2015) at 13
11
2015 Spencer Stuart Board Index, Spencer Stuart (November 2015)
12
See Spencer Stuart at 10
13
Lipton, Martin, and J. W. Lorsch A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, Business
Lawyer 48, no. 1 at 2 (November 1992)
14
id.
15
We discuss this point in detail in Part III of the paper
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have split the role between CEO and chairman.16 Over half (53%) of new independent
directors are senior executives and professionals.17 38% of directors are either current of
former CEO’s, chairmen, presidents or COO’s, 34% are other corporate executives, 23%
come from the financial sector, 9% come from academia, 4% are consultants, 2% are
lawyers, and 9% come from other fields. Gender diversity on boards is increasing, as
31% of new directors on boards are female.18 Boards are also increasingly demanding
greater female representation, as being a female was the second most wanted attribute in
a new director after being an active CEO/COO.19 The boards are also overwhelmingly
older, with the average age of independent directors being 63.1 years and only 15% of
boards having an average age of 59 years or younger. 20 Minorities are increasingly
prominent on boards, as 18% of new independent directors hired in 2015 were minorities
(up from 12% in 2014).21
Independent director representation has skyrocketed, with 84% of all S&P 500
boards being comprised of independent directors.22 The average board is comprised of
9.1 independent directors and 1.7 non-independent directors.

23

The increasing

prominence of major institutional and activist investors is also reflected in board
elections, as 92% of directors stand for election on an annual basis, rising from 51% in
2005. 24 Shareholder input is also increasingly reflected in the rise of mandatory
retirement ages for directors (73%).25 29% of boards also now have truly independent
chairs, compared with 9% in 2005.26
Board composition also reflects the rising prominence of committees. In the S&P
500, every Board had the three NYSE Committees: (1) compensation/HR, (2) audit and
(3) nominating/governance. 71% of boards have more than just the three NYSE

16

See Spencer Stuart at 12
Id. at 15-17
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.; See Also PWC, PWC’s 2015 Annual Corporate Directors Survey available at:
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-governance/annual-corporate-directors-survey/downloads.html
22
Id. at 8-23
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
17
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mandated boards, and 35% have five or more. 27 The most prominent non-NYSE
mandated committees in descending order are: the executive committee (34%), the
finance committee (31%), the risk committee (12%) and the public policy/ social &
corporate responsibility committee (10%).28 Cyber-security has also risen in prominence,
with 69% of survey respondents assigning cyber-security to an existing committee.29

1.4 Selection & Appointment
Under Delaware law, which we use as a proxy for state corporate law for reasons
discussed below, the shareholders elect directors. 30 The “most important shareholder
power is the right to elect directors, generally at annual meetings.” 31 Currently, only
individuals nominated by the company for the board of directors are included in the
company’s proxy statement and card. Shareholders may nominate their own members of
the board, but generally do not do so because of the substantial expense involved in
soliciting proxies.32 The “vast majority of director elections are uncontested”, and many
have argued that “incumbents do not currently face any meaningful risks of being
replaced via the ballot box.”33 Currently, the majority of public firms in the United States
have plurality voting rules that favor management nominees and incumbents.34
David Larcker has described the six-step process that management undergoes to
select new directors as entailing: (1) identifying the needs of the company, (2) identifying
gaps in director capabilities, (3) identifying potential candidates either through director
networks or with a professional recruiter, (4) ranking candidates in order of preference,
(5) meeting with candidates and offering the job and (6) putting each candidate up for a

27

Id.
Id. at 25
29
Id. at 25-29 (many interviewed directors discussed the possibly of a new cyber-security committee being
created in the future).
30
See §211 of the DGCL (outlining the shareholders right to elect Directors under Delaware General
Corporate Law)
31
See John W. White & Marc S. Rosenberg, The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Corporate
Governance 2010, Chapter 25 (2010)
32
Activist investors are an important caveat to this rule, but we will not address the role of activist investors
in this paper because it is of limited importance to this topic.
33
See White & Rosenberg
34
Cai, Jie, Jacqueline L. Garner, and Ralph A. Walkling, Electing directors, J. Fin., 64.5 2389, 2390 (2009)
(describing the nomination and election process of directors).
28
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shareholder vote.35 Directors are screened, ranked, and then placed in order before they
are put before a shareholder vote.36
Increasingly, major shareholders have begun to play larger roles in helping to
select boards of directors, as well as shape the rules of director elections. Activist
shareholders, along with ISS, have focused particularly on adopting majority voting for
director elections. As institutional shareholders increase their power and input relative to
management, they will likely begin to have an even greater say in director elections.

1.5 Compensation
Director compensation on American boards is largely determined by firm size.
Director compensation in large-cap corporate America has continued to grow, with
average compensation for an S&P 500 director rising to $277,235 in 2015, which has
more than doubled in the past 10 years.37 Cash payments represent only 38% of total
compensation, which has consistently declined as a percentage of overall compensation
over the last 10 years.38 Stock awards, options and other compensation linked to company
performance has risen to 59% of total compensation for directors, while 90% of boards
have share ownership guidelines for directors that are meant to align director
compensation with shareholder interest.39 Compensation for directors in companies with
market capitalization of less than $1 billion averages $125,260 while Mid-Cap director
compensation (those companies with market capitalization of $1 billion to $5 billion) was
$182,500.40

1.6 General Responsibilities
The board is often described as having two broad mandates: the mandate to advise
and the mandate to oversee.41 These mandates are also shaped by certain legal duties,
outlined below in the discussion of legal duties. The structure and internal division of
responsibilities of a board will vary by company and industry, but the board still has a
35

David F. Larcker, Board of Directors: Duties & Liabilities, Corporate Governance Research Program
Stanford Graduate School of Business at 3 (2011)
36
Id.
37
See Spencer Stuart at 30-32
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
PWC at 4
41
See Larcker
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series of basic responsibilities shaped by these two broad mandates. Mike Boland has
outlined six general responsibilities falling under these two broad mandates: (1) recruit,
supervise, retain, evaluate and compensate the managers, (2) provide direction for the
organization, (3) establish a policy based governance system, (4) govern the organization
and the relationship with the CEO, (5) uphold the fiduciary duty to protect the
organization’s assets and member’s investment, and (6) the monitor and control
function.42 Mace has more simply stated that “directors serve as a source of advice and
counsel, serve as some sort of discipline, and act in crisis situations.”43 This disciplinary
function has evolved over the past 30 years to the point that boards have become “less
passive” and have moved from being a “managerial rubber stamps to active and
independent monitors.”44 Three of these responsibilities are now mandated to have their
own committee under the NYSE rules, which require a compensation/HR committee, an
audit committee and a nominating/governance committee.45

1.7 Legal Duties
1.7.1 State Law and the Preeminence of Delaware Corporate Law
In the United States, corporate law is state law. I will be analyzing the legal duties
of directors using Delaware state corporate law, which serves as an effective proxy of
American state corporate law.46
In Delaware, the rules governing the directors of a corporation are a combination
of common law and statutory law. The Delaware General Corporation Law (Herein
referred to as the “DCGL”) is the statutory law that governs the directors of a
corporation. The Delaware state courts, and in particular the Court of Chancery, have
created the common law that governs Delaware directors.
42

Mike Boland, The Role of the Board of Directors, AG Decision Maker Iowa St. (September 2009)
Myles L. Mace, The President and the Board of Directors, Harvard Business Review (March 1972)
44
See Adams, Renee, Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of the Board of Directors
in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey at 7 (November 2008) (National Bureau
of Economic Research working paper 14486); See also Gordon at fn. 5.
45
NYSE 303A.04; NYSE 303A.05; NYSE 303A.06;NYSE 303A.07 (NYSE provisions on required
committee’s for listed companies)
46
See Lewis S. Black, Jr. Why Corporations Choose Delaware, Delaware Department of State Division of
Corporations(2007) (highlighting the pre-eminence of Delaware General Corporation Law in American
corporate law).
43
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In Delaware, the director of a corporation has a fiduciary duty to the shareholders.
Delaware law has outlined three major roles of a director created by their fiduciary duties
to shareholders: (1) “Big Picture” Decision Making, (2) Delegation and (3) Oversight.
These three roles are the direct result of the “Triad” of Fiduciary Duties created by
Delaware statutory and common law. The “Triad” of Fiduciary Duties owed by directors
are: the duties of due care, good faith and loyalty, each of which I will address
separately.47

1.7.2 Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule:
The first fiduciary duty of a director is the duty of care. The duty of care requires
that, when managing a corporation’s affairs, the director (1) act in good faith, (2) with the
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances, and (3) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation.48 In order to satisfy this duty of care, a director must meet
certain basic criteria, namely: they must have reasonable knowledge of the company’s
business, act on an informed, good-faith basis, obtain credible information on each issue,
adequately deliberate the relevant issues, and understand the consequences that will flow
from each decision before making the decision.49 It is crucial for a director to exercise
“substantive due care”, because they are then eligible for the strong shield of the business
judgment rule to protect the board members from liability.50
The business judgment rule is a presumption that if business decisions
made by the board are made by: (1) disinterested, independent directors; (2) with
informed due care; and (3) with a good faith belief that the decision will serve the
corporations best interest, the courts will not second guess a decision made by the
board. 51 In Delaware, and crucial to the directors “Big Picture” decision making and
oversight:
47

See Generally Ira M. Millstein, Jolly J. Gregory & Ashley R. Altschuler, Fiduciary Duties Under U.S.
Law (unpublished working paper with the American Bar Associations International Developments SubCommittee on Corporate Governance) (2014)
48
See Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton & Stephen A. Radin, The Business Judgment Rule: fiduciary
duties of corporate directors, Aspen Law & Business 2002
49
Id.
50
See Generally Block et. al.
51
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (describing the business judgment rule)

12

“ [The courts] do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. [They] do
not even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the
decisionmaking context is process due care only.”52
Directors in Delaware are protected from liability for unwise or poor business
decisions. Directors may, however, be held liable for a breach of duty of care when they
fail to perform their duties responsibly, in good faith, and in a reasonably prudent
manner. 53 Delaware statute has authorized shareholders to adopt a provision in the
certificate of incorporation that eliminates or limits the “personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for breach of fiduciary duty as a director,” but not for a
breach of other duties. 54 This duty of care has created a requirement that directors
approve a company’s significant business plans and extraordinary actions. 55 Some
examples of extraordinary actions include: business combinations, the retirement or
creation of debt or equity, entry into new lines of business and significant acquisitions of
stock.
While fulfilling their duty of care, directors are empowered to delegate board
functions to committees, corporate offices and independent advisors. Under the DGCL,
the board may rely in good faith on officers, employees, committees of the board of
directors or competent outside advisors, as long as due care is exercised during
selection.56 A director may not, however, delegate a task that would strip them of their
capabilities to use their judgment on management matters, or on matters that must be
performed by the Board in a statute, the by-laws or the articles of incorporation.57

52

Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 259 (Del. 2000)

53

Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 880 (Del. 1985) (outlining the standard for a directors duty of care)
(note that in response to the decision, the legislature enacted §102(b)(7) of the DGCL that allows a
corporation to enact provision “eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director” for a breach of
their Duty of Care).
54
§102(b)(7)
55
Millstein at 9-13
56
§141(e)
57
Millstein at 9-13; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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1.7.3 The Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty for a director mandates that “the best interest of the
corporation and its shareholders take precedence over any other interest possessed by a
director.” 58 A director may not engage in self-dealing, misappropriate corporate
opportunities or assets, have conflicts of interest, or otherwise profit in an action that is
not substantively or “entirely” fair. Unlike for a breach of duty of care, a director’s
personal liability for breaches of duty of loyalty may not be limited by a corporate charter
or by-law provision.59

1.7.4 The Duty of Good Faith
A director has a duty to act in good faith. According to Chief Justice Veasey of
the Delaware Supreme Court, good faith “requires an honesty of purpose and eschews a
disingenuous mindset of seeming to act for the corporation good, but not caring for the
well being of the constituents the fiduciary.”60 Traditionally, this duty of “good faith” has
been linked to the duty of loyalty, but according to some scholars it may be “considered
to be an additional duty” to the duty of loyalty.61

1.7.5 Federal Duties & The Audit Committee
Following the Enron scandal and the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (herein called
“SOX”) by Congress, some scholars such as Lisa Fairfax have argued that directors’
fiduciary duties are becoming increasingly “federalized”, as Congress has begun to
encroach on the traditional role played by the state legislatures in outlining the fiduciary
duties of corporate directors. In particular, SOX enhances the monitoring role of directors
by “making directors who serve on the audit committee of a corporation responsible for

58

See Stone v. Ritter, No. CIV.A. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2006) (outlining the Duty
of Loyalty)

59

§102(b)(7) (explicitly not allowing a corporation to shield a director “for any breach of the director's duty
of loyalty”)
60
See E. Norman Veasey, Reflections on Key Issues of the Professional Responsibilities of Corporate
Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 12 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y at 9-19 (2003).
61
Id.
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closely overseeing auditors’ work as well as any disagreements related to that work.”62
Key provisions of SOX which federalize director duties include Section 301 requiring an
independent audit committee, Section 302 which “implicate[s] the directors’ duty to keep
abreast of corporate financial affairs” by creating an obligation for the CEO & CFO to
oversee the audit committee, Section 305 expanding the SEC’s power to bar and penalize
directors, Section 306 limiting the ability of directors to trade in company securities, and
Section 404 which expands board liability for the annual report. SOX “not only
federalizes [some] corporate fiduciary duties, but also adds substance to them.” 63
This encroachment by the federal government into a territory that is normally the
sole purview of the states could potentially shift power away from directors and to
shareholders. 64 Payne described the original heightening of director standards in the
1960’s as a “movement toward an ever increasing moral delicacy and sophistication in
the recondite area of the legal regulation of the American corporation” leading to a
scenario where “the deliberate forces of justice and morality seem to be tightening the
screws on corporate law” and burdening directors with new obligations. This shift, seen
over the past twenty years in the usurpment of power from both boards and state
governments by the federal government is arguably just a new development in this
continuing trend.65

1.7.6 NYSE Standards
The NYSE worked in tandem with the SEC to further heighten the duties placed
upon the directors of listing members with rule changes in 2002 that required a majority
of independent directors, narrowed the definition of independent directors, and created
independent corporate governance & compensation committees. 66 The NASDAQ also
62

See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary Duty Through
Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. Rev 393,500 (2005)
63
See Fairfax at 401-406
64
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1125, 1144 (2003) (arguing that SOX could lead to a power shift from
directors to shareholders)
65
See Bayne, David C. A Philosophy of Corporate Control, U. PA. L. Rev. 112.1 at 5 (1963)
66 See Morrison & Foerster, Client Alert: NYSE Adopts Changes to its Corporate Governance and Listing
Standards (August 2002) available at: http://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/2002/08/nyse-adoptschanges-to-its-corporate-governance (describing the rules changes implemented by the SEC, NASDAQ &
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passed similar rules that heightened board standards and created two new required
committees.67 The exchanges should be considered a fourth key actor, along with the
shareholders, the state government and the federal government in creating and enforcing
governance standards on directors.

1.8 History of the American Board
1.8.1 Historical Development of the American Board
The board of directors in the United States has risen as a response to what Berle &
Means described in their seminal study as “the separation of ownership and control” in
the American corporation.68 Because of the historically dispersed ownership of capital in
America, there have been collective action problems for shareholders to monitor
corporate management. 69 The board in the American context can be thought of
representing the widely dispersed shareholder by solving the “practical difficulty of
shareholders monitoring” management on their behalf. This board in its modern existence
is best viewed as “an independent, rather than a representative, body”70 of shareholders,
but this independence should work towards the aid of shareholders. Although there is
significant conflict in the literature regarding the purpose for the existence of the unitary
board, one conclusion that can be drawn is that the American board exists in its current
structure largely out of cultural inheritance and path dependency.
“The norm that the ultimate power over corporate management resides in an
elected board has always existed in the American corporate statutes.”71 Although New
York State was the first American state to codify the election of directors to control the
management of a corporation, this legislation was merely a reflection of accepted
corporate practice dating back to English colonization of North America.72 This AngloAmerican historical precedent has played an enormous role in shaping the American
NYSE); See Also Calkoen for a narrative history of the SEC, NYSE & NASDAQ’s efforts to implement
these rule changes.
67
Id.
68
See Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932)
69
id.(dispersed ownership stands in contrast with other nations whose capital markets are dominated by
large, controlling blockholders more able to effectively monitor corporate management)
70
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33
Hofstra L. Rev. at 16 (2004-2005)
71
Id. at 10
72
Id.
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board structure. For example, the Charter of the Bank of the United States was directly
modeled on the Bank of England’s provision calling for an elected board of directors to
manage the corporation. 73 The first Bank of the United States’ charter, however, was
unique in having the board of directors elect the equivalent of the CEO.74 This charter
would serve as a model charter for future corporate charters, with its single-tier structure
and re-enforcement of emerging norms favoring shareholder primacy.

1.8.2 Shareholder Primacy
Unlike in Germany and other continental European countries that seek to give
major roles on the board to stakeholders, the model of shareholder primacy is uniquely
Anglo-American in tradition and has only been further entrenched in the late 20th and
early 21st century by the Anglo-American norms of free market capitalism.
American notions of shareholder primacy are unique and play an important role in
American board structure. Virginia Harper Ho outlines the ideology of shareholder
primacy, stating “it is most often equated simply with the view that the purpose of the
corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth.” 75 The corporate norm of shareholder
primacy has been subject to long and contentious debate. According to D. Gordon Smith,
during the early history of the republic “corporate charters and incorporation statutes
often identified a public interest associated with incorporation…suggest[ing] that the
corporations were operated on some basis other than shareholder primacy.” 76 Case law
did not begin to reflect notions of shareholder primacy until the 1830’s, when cases such
as Gray v. Portland Bank began to hold that “the corporation could not act except for the
benefit of existing shareholders.” 77 The notion of shareholder primacy became fully
engrained in the American corporate lexicon by early 20th century, although there were
important caveats to the norm. In particular, during the 1950’s and 1960’s at the height of
corporate managerialism, Jeffrey Gordon argues that boards would functionally value

73

Id. at 16-18
Id.
75
Virginia Harper Ho, Enlightened Shareholder Value: Corporate Governance beyond the ShareholderStakeholder Divide, 36 J. Corp. L. at 73 (2010-2011).
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stakeholder interests in management practices. 78 Despite these caveats, the state
legislatures never took action like in Germany to require direct representation of
important stakeholder interests such as employees, or allow the involvement of the
government, creditors and others. Instead, stakeholder interests were and remain
governed by legislation and contract law, not board representation. Since at least the
1980’s, the American norm has been that the corporation should “have as its objective the
conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder
gain.”79
Adolfe Berle and Merrick Dodd’s classic normative debate in the Harvard Law
Review over the role of shareholders versus stakeholders in the 1930’s was illustrative of
the challenges to the ultimately triumphant consensus of shareholder primacy in
American corporate law.80 Berle understood corporate power conceded to management as
“intended to be used only on behalf of all” shareholders and that actions by corporate
management “intended to be greatened for the purpose of benefiting one set of
participants as against another…. [w]ould be to violate every intendment of the whole
corporate situation.” 81 Berle’s conception of corporate law as a “variant of trust law”
conceptualized corporate managers owing fiduciaries duties to the shareholder
beneficiaries,82 and is in many ways reflective of the modern DGCL.
Dodd instead argued from a normative perspective, viewing the duties of
corporate managers as wider than that to shareholders.83 Berle may have described the
corporate entity as how it existed, but in Dodd’s mind “it [was] undesirable, even with
the laudable purpose of giving stockholders much-needed protection against self-seeking
managers, to give increased emphasis at the present time to the view that the business
corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders.”84 Dodd
instead expressed the need to focus on worker protection and representation, as well as
78
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public policy and the public good. There has been intensive debate over which side is
correct, but it is clear that in the United States Berle’s notion of shareholder primacy over
stakeholders has reigned supreme, and this principle is reflected in American board
structure. As will be discussed later in this paper, Germany has been more sympathetic to
Dodd’s view, favoring stakeholder interest and representation on the two-tiered board.
During the late 19th century when Germany implemented a two-tiered board, it “was the
legislators intention to protect both shareholders and the public interest”, and this view
still maintains prominence in the German board structure.85

1.9 Advantages of the Single-Tier Board
The advantages of the single-tier board versus the two-tiered board can be
categorized as: (1) having a superior flow of information, (2) faster decision making and
(3) better understanding and involvement in the business by the board.86
A single-tier boards’ superior flow of information comes from its’ structure and
size. Unlike a two-tiered board, a single-tier board has a greater number of meetings
where every member of the board is present. The board, which also houses the various
committees, imports a wide array of knowledge on both the manager and the monitor
(because all board members must be both in the US)87. By housing both the CEO and the
independent monitors, the board also has constant contact with the executives of the
company, which can promote individual relationships, better understanding of the
business and a greater prominence of the supervisory function of the board in
management decision making. As Jungmann has argued, because “the non-executive
directors are involved in the decision-making process, they have more incentives to
supply themselves with all relevant information, since they cannot argue afterwards that
they were limited to an ex post control of decisions made by other persons.”88
The single-tier board is also structured to make faster decisions. Because the
management and supervisory board are combined, there is no need for separate approval
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of decisions. Perhaps most importantly, formal board meetings take place more regularly
allowing more responsive decisionmaking.
Finally, the combination of more frequent meetings and the unity of the
management and supervisory board allows more integration into the business strategy
and decision making between the directors and management. When the CEO is on the
board and there is a diverse array of business backgrounds on the board (as previously
discussed the vast majority of all board members are corporate executives, financial
executives, lawyers, accountants and consultants), there is a higher likelihood of
understanding the intricacies of each business decision. 89 This skill set also allows
independent directors to be better placed to challenge any potential problems in strategy
proposed by management. Better familiarity with the business may help the board make
better decisions.

1.10 Disadvantages of a Single-Tier Board
The primary disadvantage of the Single-Tier board is that it has to simultaneously
make and monitor the same decision. Mere independence may not be enough to make a
board member neutral, in particular when the board is small, there are substantial
personal relationships with the board members, and compensation of the board member is
directly tied to company performance90.
There is another concern that the effectiveness of corporate control depends on
the personality “of both the non-executive directors….and the chairman.” The personality
of the chairman can be particularly dangerous in the American context if there is a joint
CEO/chairman of the imperial variety. Increasing resistance to the imperial CEO by ISS
and institutional investors has made this less of a problem. Nonetheless, non-executive
directors must have both the knowledge base and self-confidence to directly stand up to
the CEO/chairman to prevent domination of the board by the CEO.
There is also concern of the existence of a “serial director.” If the independent
director is an executive director on another board, they may be less likely to engage in
89
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effective monitoring if they wish for there to be more relaxed monitoring on their own
board.91 This “boys club” effect may not be prevented by mere independence.
Finally, personal relationship can play a major role in both appointment and
effective monitoring. In a world where over half of independent directors are outside
executives, it is unclear if boards are truly “independent” or if they are just boys clubs of
executives, bankers & advisors. Even independent directors may be reluctant to expose
the failings of a peer or friend in the boardroom. Delaware case law has heightened the
independence test, but personal relationships that develop in the boardroom likely cannot
be prevented without an unrealistic independence standard.92 The personal relationships
that can encourage the flow of information between the board and the company’s
management can potentially serve as a double-edged sword. Monitoring may be more
difficult when there are feelings of gratitude or norms of social deference to colleagues.93
Independent directors, even though acting in good faith, are also likely to be impacted by
their preferences due to “uncontrollable cognitive processes.” 94 These personal biases
may exist in two-tier boards, but they are particularly problematic in one-tier boards
when independent directors are attempting to supervise management whom they
consistently work and socialize with on the same board.

II. The German Corporate Board
This part of the paper will first describe the legal framework (A.) and two-tier
structure in Germany (B.), before highlighting its historic development (C.), the
consequential systemic effects (D.) and finally analyzing the state of convergence
between the systems (E.).
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2 Legal Framework in Germany
In the tradition of civil law countries, corporate law in Germany is based on a wide
variety of statutory regulations and the non-statutory German Corporate Governance
Code (Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, “GCGC”)95.
Some statues with wide discretion allow certain company forms to adopt a voluntary
two-tier structure.96 If implemented, the company’s articles of incorporation govern it. A
European limited-liability company (Societas Europaea, “SE”) may also choose its own
board system, then governed by the Council Regulation on the SE 97 as well as the
German Implementation Act98. The GCGC may be applicable for public companies, but
deviation is possible.99
Other statutes such as the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, “AktG”)100
make a two-tier system for limited companies (Kapitalgesellschaften) mandatory. 101
There is almost no digression allowed in the articles from the statutory composition and
tasks.102 Difference from the self-regulatory GCGC in public companies must always be
explained. Also, codetermination laws103 as well as state supervision of certain industries
95
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(i.e. banking or insurance104) can affect the composition and tasks of the boards in a twotier structure.

3 Germany’s mandatory Two-Tier Board System
Within Germany’s mandatory two-tier structure, the executive directors in the
management board (Vorstand) decide about the company’s objectives and implement the
necessary measures.105 Meanwhile, the non-executive directors in the supervisory board
(Aufsichtsrat) monitor these decisions on behalf of other parties.106

3.1 The Management Board
The members of the management board are appointed107 and dismissed for cause108
by the supervisory board. 109 The number of board members varies according to the
company’s size, the applicability of codetermination rules and statutes in the articles
between one or more persons, averaging in 2012 on 5.6 members.110
While the management board also represents the company in and out of court111, it
is their main responsibility to jointly run the business.112 Thus, the management board
provides the strategic direction for the company through careful planning of
104
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operations.113 It also manages the workforce, coordinates tasks and controls the strategic
focus of the company.114 Its tasks involve i.e. maintaining the books of account115 and
keeping themselves 116 , the supervisory board 117 , the shareholders 118 and federal
authorities119 informed about the state of the company.

3.2 The Supervisory Board
3.2.1 Appointment, Size & Composition
The shareholders usually appoint the members of the supervisory board during
their annual meeting (Hauptversammlung, “general meeting”).120 If codetermination laws
must be applied, depending on the size of the workforce one third121 or one half122 of the
board members are elected by the employees.123 In addition, certain shareholders may be
granted the right in the articles to directly dispatch up to one third of the shareholding
representing members of the board. 124 Whoever appoints the board member may also
remove them by decision.125
The total number of board members can range from 3 to 21 members depending
on the amount of share capital, the influence of codetermination and the articles of the
company.126 In codetermined, listed companies, at least 30% of the supervisory board
113
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members need to be female and respectively male. 127 Besides codetermination and
diversification, the composition of the board is determined by additional factors: the
expertise of the members128, a limit on the amount of parallel supervisory board mandates
of each member129 and, most importantly, the prohibition of a simultaneous seat on the
management board130. Other personal requirements can only be requested in the articles
for members appointed by the general meeting.131
Thus,

the

supervisory

board

members

can

represent

(1) shareholders,

(2) employees, (3) labor unions 132 , (4) the company’s group holdings 133 , (5) business
partners, (6) creditors or (7) state representatives134.

3.2.2 Tasks
On the one hand, the supervisory board controls the decision of the management
ex post.135 The supervisory board reviews the management by inspecting the books136,
reviewing the annual report137, issuing and overseeing the work of an external auditor138,
analyzing the information provided by the management board 139 and reporting to the
general meeting140. In addition, the supervisory board also has standing for court actions
against the management.141
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On the other hand, the supervisory board can influence the management board to
exert ex ante control. 142 While it cannot directly interfere in the management of the
company143, the articles or the supervisory board must name certain important actions
that can only be performed with the consent of the supervisory board.144 These are, for
example, the extension of credits from the company to members of one of the boards145
or measures that fundamentally change the assets or projected earnings of the
company146. Furthermore, other ways to influence management exist for the supervisory
board, for example, by setting incentives through the remuneration147 and regular advise
on strategic decisions.148
Another function of the supervisory board is the balancing of all interests present in
the company by networking with business partners, shareholders, employees and
creditors.149

3.3 The General Meeting
The general meeting of shareholders is the third organ in a limited company.150 Yet,
only the supervisory board can preemptively monitor the management board as the
general meeting can only act after misconduct occurred. 151 Possible actions include
resolutions about important company decisions and the appointment of the supervisory
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board or auditor.152 Statutory liability153 of the boards is limited by a business judgment
rule and the exculpation of the boards for the last fiscal year by the general meeting.154
Disclosure155, the market for corporate control156 and incentives in contracts are further
control devices of the shareholders.

4 Historic Development
4.1 Path Dependency
One explanation for the historic development of Germany’s corporate law system
can be found in a “mixture of economic, political and cultural factors”157. These inherited
norms and values continuously shape a systems development like a path.158
The legal situation in Germany, in which the first modern companies emerged, was
one in which neither a one nor a two-tier system was obligatory. 159 Instead, the
management board was seen as an officer of the shareholders, while (if implemented) the
supervisory body was nothing more than a shareholder committee. But as the social view
changed, the managers started to consider all stakeholder interests.160 Subsequently, it
was in the interest of the shareholders to have a separate supervisory body to control a
management that considers other interests besides theirs. Moreover, it was also in the
interest of all other stakeholders to have a separate control unit for the management. An
independent board could check if the management actually considered their interests, as
152
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shareholders still employ it. 161 With a law revision in 1897, the new cultural
understanding was transformed into legal practice. Instead of a state permit system that
before had served to protect all stakeholders162, a mandatory two-tier structure for limited
companies was introduced.163
Like many other legal ideas in the 19th century, the idea of strictly separating
management and control stems from the academic study of the Roman legal system.164
Even though the Romans did not know limited companies in the modern
understanding 165 , they promoted the separation of “gestio” (execution) and “election,
instruction et custodia” (election, instruction and supervision).166 Therefore, an example
of how the desire to follow an historic ideal shaped the modern German corporate law
system.
Similarly the laws on codetermination have been influenced by cultural changes.
Workers demanded “industrial democracy” 167 and more influence, threatening wide
reaching strikes in the then largest German industry of coal and steel production. Thus,
the Acts on Codetermination were first in the form of the Montan-MitbestG introduced in
this industry in 1952 and slowly extended to other branches of industry in the following
decades.168
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Nowadays, the new corporate law regulations from the European Union (“EU”)
promote the political goal of a level playing field for all companies and stakeholders.169
Thus, the SE was introduced to allow companies to undertake business on an EU wide
scale.170 Hereby, the option to choose a board system was implemented as a compromise
between EU members.171 This development was thus also shaped by social and political
factors.

4.2 Efficiency
Another approach to explain the development of a specific system is to focus on the
economic strive for efficiency.172 Shareholders will try to maximize their profits.173 Thus,
they will avoid a sub-optimal corporate governance system. Shareholder pressure then
entices improvement of a company’s governance and in consequence creates liquidity for
it from capital markets.174
An explanation why incorporating supervision is efficient is derived from Agency
Theory. As executive control of the company is given to managers instead of
shareholders, exploitation possibilities emerge for the management, which runs the risk
of lowering shareholder’s return. Thus, the separation of interests produces agency costs,
which can be lowered through control. 175 It is also more cost efficient to focus
supervision in the hands of someone specialized, than for each shareholders to employ it
themselves. 176 Additionally in Germany, a traditional lack of minority shareholder
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protection has led to large block-holdings as the more efficient investment choice.177 As a
consequence, less liquid capital markets evolved that made it harder to quickly change
unsatisfying investments. Therefore, direct corporate control is needed to counterbalance
immobility and a specialized, separate board, untainted by conflicts of interest related to
the management, seems a rational choice.178
Resource Dependence Theory offers another explanation based on efficiency
considerations. It states that external resources available to the company affect its
behavior. 179 As a company depends on employees, the most effective compromise in
Germany to permanently secure this external resource was codetermination. Another
necessary resource is outside capital. Because debt financing by banks was more
prominent in Germany than equity financing180, bank representatives on the supervisory
board were seen as beneficial. The company could continuously inform them about the
state of the company and positively effect refinancing decisions. Thus, stakeholder
instead of shareholder orientation of both boards allows for the most efficient
procurement of resources in Germany.
But these solutions are only efficient in the historic circumstances set by society and
law. Therefore one more explanation is delivered by Contingency Theory, which states,
that a system develops within the boundaries of its path, always searching for the most
efficient solution in light of the path’s circumstances.181

5 Consequences of a mandatory Two-Tier System
5.1 Efficient Monitoring through Separation
A separate board with the power to influence management through consent, advise
and incentives is an effective, preemptive form of monitoring. 182 Another important
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monitoring task is the supervision of executive actions, where effectiveness depends on
(1) independence from management, (2) information access and (3) overcoming
operational challenges.

5.1.1 Independence
Because of a “natural self justification tendency” 183 a supervisor can never
efficiently monitor his own decisions. Therefore, this conflict of interest should always be
avoided by exerting control through someone who is independent of the day-to-day
management.184 This can be a separate supervisory board that does not meet with the
same frequency as the management.185
Another conflict of interest is created if the executive managers have influence on
the selection of the supervisor. Monitoring might be limited in fear of dismissal.186 In the
German two-tier system, management cannot exert influence on the employees’ board
seats, though employee representatives are due to their workforce connection also not
truly independent. 187 If the management also holds shares a management nominated
supervisor could be elected. 188 As the required majority may only be lowered in the
articles through another majority vote, both votes serve to ensure that the election is in
the interest of all shareholders. 189 In order to reduce possible management influence
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further, the supervisory board should also include an adequate number of independent
members to compensate the possible dependence of the others.190 Furthermore, in 2013
on average 97% of all supervisory boards established a joint nomination committee of
shareholder representatives to propose qualified candidates to the general meeting in a
transparent process. 191 A majority of three fourths required for a dismissal of a
supervisory board member further reduces a single shareholder’s influence.192
Thus, the German corporate governance system gives personnel authority to those
stakeholders in whose interest control is performed - freeing supervisors from personal
dependence to the management. In 2011 the supervisory boards of the 100 biggest
German companies averaged 21% independent directors, 49% employee representatives,
8% direct shareholder nominations, 5% former executives and 19% other nonindependent mandates.193

5.1.2 Information Asymmetry
Although independence from management is important, an uninvolved supervisor
might lack the information or knowledge needed to exert efficient supervision on
executive actions.
One problem arising from the remoteness of the separate supervisory board is a
lack of insider business knowledge. It is harder to comprehend, efficiently evaluate and
objectively contribute to management actions if economic considerations and alternatives
are not presented and understood by the board.194 Consequently, the supervisory board
should be composed of capable members who receive regular further training. 195
Moreover, they need to get to know the company inside and outside the boardroom.196
190
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Another option to ensure knowledge about the business is the appointment of former
members of the management. 197 But their number is limited to two 198 , as the direct
relation to the management might affect their independence and hinder the removal of
previous strategic mistakes.199
The information asymmetry is even more pronounced when the supervisory board
is solely dependent on the management as a source of information.200 The management
board has an obligation to regularly provide specific information and special reports if
requested.201 However this means, that management handles all information, tainting it
with their personal opinion on what should be emphasized or even reported at all.202
Therefore, the risk of inefficient control due to a lack of information is increased.203 Yet,
the right of the supervisory board to inspect all documentation of the company in person
reduces the information asymmetry. 204 A reduction is also achieved by implementing
specific board practices, such as defining which data to collect or when exactly in which
form the management should deliver comprehensive information.205 The members of the
management board also regularly join the entirety of the supervisory board meeting and
may provide information there as well or can be subjected to further questions.206
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5.1.3 Operational Challenges
A third aspect of effective supervision lies in the ability of a board to overcome
operational challenges that may hinder monitoring. That includes implementing routines
that guarantee independence and the flow of information. But it also is the ability to ask
critical questions and solve interpersonal conflicts such as defensive management
behavior or other group dynamics. 207 The chairman of the supervisory board hereby
fulfills an important intermediate position, as he coordinates work with the management
board through regular meetings.208 Conducting regular evaluations can also help to raise
awareness of all members of the boards to the importance of addressing operational
challenges and information asymmetries.209

5.2 Implications specific to Germanys Corporate Law System
Additionally, systemic factors such as codetermination, ownership structure, bank
influence and stakeholder orientation also have implications on the German governance
structure.

5.2.1 Codetermination
Through codetermination shareholder influence on a company is diluted.210 But
social peace and a reduced strike risk are seen as a worthy gain that cannot be achieved
otherwise as cost efficiently by contract.211 Shareholders also maintain the deciding vote

207

Bezemer et al, 14 Corp. Gov. Int`l. J., 15, 15 & 21 f. & 24 (2014).
No. 5.2 subpara. 1 sent. 2, supbara. 3 sent. 1 GCGC; Roberts et al, Brit. J. Mgmt., S5, S12 (2005);
Kakabadse, Andrew; Kakabadse, Nada; Barratt, Ruth, Chairman and chief executive officer (CEO): that
sacred and secret relationship, Journal of Management Development, Vol. 25, No. 2, 134 - 150, 141 f.
(2006); in the biggest 100 German companies: in 2012 32 cases were chairman was former member of
management board of the same company, Monopolies Commission, 227 (2014).
209
No. 5.6 GCGC; Conger, Jay; Finegold, David; Lawler III, Edward, Appraising Boardroom Performance,
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 76, No. 1, 136 - 148, 138 (1998); Long, Tracy, This Year’s Model:
influences on board and director evaluation, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 14, 547
- 557, 554 f. (2006); Bezemer et al, 14 Corp. Gov. Int`l. J., 15, 15 (2014).
210
Pistor, Katharina, Corporate Governance durch Mitbestimmung und Arbeitsmärkte, in: Hommelhoff,
Peter; Jopt, Klaus, v. Werder, Axel (Editors), Handbuch Corporate Governance - Leitung und
Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts- und Wirtschaftspraxis, 2nd edition, Köln, 231 252, 236 (2009).
211
Hopt, Leyens, 1 ECFR, 135, 145 (2004); Waltermann, Raimund, Arbeitsrecht, 17th edition, München
recital 898 (2014).
208

34

and fundamental decisions can still only be made by the general meeting.212 But mistrust
could arise, if leaked information is used as a tactical advantage or if the management is
reluctant to disclose information that goes against workers’ interest. 213 Thus, strict
confidentiality rules are enforced on all214 and others are not allowed to join meetings.215
Meetings may also be prepared separately, allowing each party to find common ground in
their own ranks.216
Though representatives are elected by and out of the workforce or unions, they
still must be qualified.217 As they often come from a company’s middle management they
usually possess an in-depth knowledge of the company that allows them to communicate
its real needs and problems.218 Therefore, the diversification of knowledge may increase
business opportunities.219 Yet, in a larger board of up to 21 members, averaging in 2013
on 17 members220, a general consensus between all might be hard to find.221 In addition, a
minimum of only four supervisory board meetings a year severely limits the possibility
for contributions of each member.222 Division of tasks in board committees, for example
an audit or remuneration committee can solve this dilemma partially. 223 In 2013 on
average 4.6 committees were installed on German supervisory boards.224
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5.2.2 Ownership Structure
Furthermore, ownership structure in Germany used to be block oriented, in
comparison to a market oriented system in the U.S. with dispersed ownership.225
One feature is interlocking, which occurs when board members also serve on
other companies’ boards.226 On the one hand, this restricts direct competition and can
bring fresh, expert views to the board.227 By being in demand companies and directors
can also prove their worth on the job market.228 On the other hand, only keeping a small
group in power might hinder the up rise of new economic ideas and cement class
structures.229 Conflicts of interest can also occur if members sit on competitors’ boards.
Therefore, the allocation of seats and allowed activities of board members are limited and
restricted by the consent of the supervisory board and disclosure to the shareholders.230
As board members with too many mandates might also not be able to properly fulfill their
tasks, they need to assure they can muster enough time, as tasks cannot be mandated to
others.231 Overall in 2013, 11% of all directors in Germany had 3 or more mandates on
other boards.232
Formerly prominent cross holdings between companies are also slowly
diminishing.233 In the biggest 100 German companies 35 companies were invested into
18 other companies in 2012.234 This shows a drop in capital investment from 143 in 1996
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to 58 in 2012. 235 Additionally, on average other companies held 5.8% seats on
supervisory boards.236
Another still existing characteristic of Germany’s capital markets are large blockholdings, leading to less liquid capital markets. Though financing can be achieved
otherwise, the options are more limited than in a strictly market oriented system. 237
However, less liquid markets, lead to shareholder immobility and more enduring
investments, thus allowing long-term value creation.238 Due to a favorable tax exemption
on selling company stock in 2000 the large block-holdings were partially diluted.239 But
still, families control 1/3 of the 30 biggest German companies.240 In these companies
special approval rights and side-payments play an important role, leading to a less
transparent market.241 In 2012 out of the 100 biggest companies in Germany 21 had a
foreign controlling shareholder, 15 were controlled by the state, 26 by families, 8 had
other controlling entities, 50 were in dispersed ownership with over 50% of shares traded
and only 7 companies were without a controlling shareholder.242

5.2.3 Influence of the Banking Sector
As there is no institutional separation between commercial and investment
banking in Germany 243 , universal banks can take on a simultaneous position of (1)
depositary of voting rights, (2) shareholder and (3) creditor.244 Between these positions
conflicts of interests can arise. Deposited shares could be voted in favor of an own
agenda or always in favor of management proposals.245 On the other hand, the practice of
giving banks seats on supervisory boards provides professional financial expertise to the
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board.246 In theory, the insight in the state of the company could be used to accumulate
supervisory costs and base a bank’s credit decisions on that knowledge.247 But there is
little evidence that banks base these decisions on supervision248, instead using the board
just as a tool to network.249 As critique of their position arose, they widely withdrew from
boards of industrial companies.250 Their involvement fell over 80% in the last 20 years
and in 2012 in the 100 biggest German companies only 1.4% of supervisory board seats
were filled with bank representatives.251 The tax exemption of 2000 also allowed them to
sell large shareholdings and new regulation limits the activities of depository voting and
supplements it by a management run proxy system.252 From all German listed shares in
2014 only 3.3% were still held by financial institutions.253

5.2.4 Stakeholder Orientation
One more aspect of the German system is its stakeholder orientation in comparison
to the shareholder value approach in America.254 While the management board has wide
discretion in the running of the business, it is bound to restrictions set by the supervisory
board, the articles and basic255 or solicited256 decisions of the general meeting.257 This
restriction follows from the fact that the management board is, on the one hand, an officer
of the shareholders. Consequently, the codification of the German business judgment rule
only refers to the shareholders best interest, and not the interests of the entire
enterprise.258 But on the other hand, both boards due to a cultural understanding take into
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account the interest of other stakeholders of the company as well. 259 Stakeholder
orientation can help a company to fulfill its social responsibilities260 and concentrate on
long-term value creation, increasing stability.261 In addition, it can encourage otherwise
mostly passive shareholders to actively engage in the company to increase their share
value.262

III. The American and German Board Compared and
Contrasted
“Systems of corporate governance, like a society’s other important institutions,
contain its cultural values.”

263

The differences in American and German governance

standards portray contrasting corporate norms, and different understandings of
capitalism. Below, we discuss how differences in (1) board size, (2) number of board
meetings, (3) stakeholder versus shareholder interests, (4) independent versus
representative directors and (5) director compensation are illustrations of these different
corporate values which make each system of governance uniquely tailored to reflect each
societies values.

5.1 Board Size
One of the distinct differences between American and German boards is size.
American boards average roughly 10.8 board members, while German boards are
somewhere in the range of 23. The literature on board size suggests that American
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companies should outperform German, but that is not necessarily the case. In fact, there
is little evidence that either board has given a strategic advantage to corporations.264
Eisenberg, echoing Lipton, points to two primary reasons why larger boards could
hurt firm performance: (1) increased problems of communication and (2) decreased
ability of the board to control management, leading to agency problems from the
separation of management and control. 265 It is important to note that Eisenberg also
hypothesized that larger boards would have more independent directors, and that those
directors would be highly risk adverse due to a negligible financial stake in the
companies success, but substantial risk of reputational damage from a companies
failure.266 German boards have fewer independent directors (on average 21%267), so it
could be that the increased independence of the American one-tier board makes the
American system less effective. It is also possible, though, that Eisenberg’s third critique
is no longer relevant in light of the shifting compensation structures of directors that align
firm performance with director compensation.268
Eisenberg’s research found that “firms with small boards attain higher returns on
investment in relation to their industry peers.”

269

Eisenberg does point to three

alternative explanations for his findings: firms might increase board size due to poor
profitability, large boards could just be a product of firms maturing in their life cycle or
that large boards could be representative of problems endemic in the firm (citing the
existence of bank representatives on boards with substantial debt).270
A GMI study published in the Wall Street Journal 2014 found strikingly similar
results to Eisenberg regarding board size and profitability. 271 The study found that
amongst major American corporations, the stock of firms with smaller board
264
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outperformed their peers by 8.5%.272 Some of the reasons cited in the article were that
there is “more effective oversight of management” by smaller boards, smaller boards are
more likely to dismiss their CEOs for poor performance and smaller boards are more
likely to be “decisive, cohesive and hands-on.”273
TheCorporateCounsel.net, run by Dave Lynn, one of the worlds’ leading
attorneys on corporate governance, is also highly critical of large boards.274 Some of the
advantages listed by smaller boards include:

greater flexibility, better interpersonal

relationships, meetings tend to be more informal and individual directors are more likely
to assume responsibility.275 The international data on board size also seems to suggest
that firms with smaller boards tend to outperform similar firms with larger boards in both
the United Kingdom and Asia.276
Academics & practitioners both seem to overwhelmingly favor smaller boards,
yet there seems to be little evidence that American boards outperform their German
counterparts, even though German boards are on average twice as big. There are a few
reasons why this perplexing conundrum may exist. First, what may matter is the size of
the management board, and not the supervisory board. Although German boards are
rather large, their management boards tend to only have around 6 members, which is
quite small. It could be that the German two-tier board, by keeping its management board
so small, has managed to incorporate the positive aspects of the smaller American onetier board entirely in its management board. A second explanation could be that large
supervisory boards are so effective at monitoring the corporation that the negatives of the
larger German board are outweighed by the positives of cleaner, less corrupt German
corporations.277 A third potential explanation, such as the one proposed by Eisenberg, is
272
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that independent directors are less willing to take risks than executive directors. Finally,
one more answer is that there simply has not been enough research on the subject to make
a definitive conclusion, and that further research comparing similarly situated German
and American counterparts could lead to a conclusion more in line with the existing
literature on board size.

5.2 Board Meetings
One advantage of the American one-tier board often cited in the literature is that
because there are more frequent board meetings in American versus German
corporations, there are both better personal relationships on the board and a better
diffusion of information between the directors and management. It is unclear if this
conventional wisdom is actually true, however. Although German boards are required to
meet at least 4 times per year, there are often more informal meetings or other meetings
that go unreported. It may be the case that German boards nearly equally as frequently as
their American peers informally, but there is little evidence to support this.278
One thing that is clear, however, is that similar to board size, the conventional
wisdom in the literature is that more board meetings are better.279 Board meetings are
seen as an important resource in improving board effectiveness, and that one of the most
common problems that directors’ face is lack of time.

5.3 Stakeholder v. Shareholder
The most obvious difference in German and American boards, other than size, is
composition. American boards are overwhelmingly composed of independent directors
that are either executives or members of the financial industry. German boards, by
legislation and reflective of the German policy of codetermination, are required to reserve
up to half of the seats on their supervisory board for employees. This board composition
is reflective of the competing paradigms in American and German corporate governance:
stakeholder versus shareholder primacy.
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In Germany’s two-tier system, the Codetermination Act of 1976 provides for a
supervisory board of 12, 16 or 20, depending on the number of employees of the firm.280
The average supervisory board size in Germany is 17.1, with the largest German firms
maintaining the 20 person supervisory board. 281 The number of directors on the
management board, however, is not subject to statutory regulation, and averages on 5.6
members. The management board in Germany is comprised entirely of non-independent
executives, with one executive being designated chairman or spokesperson. 282 The
overall composition of the management board is also dependent on firm size and
industry: Under the MitbestG there is “quasi-parity” codetermination with the deciding
vote going to the chairman, and for the coal, iron and steel industries there is parity with
the deciding vote going to an independent board member.283 The boards representation,
composed of non-independent management directors, 1/2 employee supervisory
directors, other stakeholder supervisory directors and 1/3 independent and shareholder
supervisory directors, is broadly representative of the codetermination model entrenched
in the GCGC, which states that “the company is to be managed in the interest of the
enterprise” 284 , including employees and other stakeholder interests. 285 This view of
corporate governance, echoed by Merrick Dodd and others, is entrenched in German
corporate governance.
The American view of shareholder primacy is reflected in the unitary board
structure as well as board composition. The board is seen as an independent supervisor,
as opposed to a partly representative supervisor of stakeholders such as in Germany.
American boards do not maintain seats for stakeholders such as employees like in
Germany. Instead, American labor rights and other stakeholder interests are governed by
contract and governmental regulation.286 Some, such as Marleen O’Connor, encouraged
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the United States to adopt director fiduciary duties to their employees.287 Many scholars
favoring an abandonment of shareholder primacy embraced the German and Japanese
codetermination models in the 1980’s when it appeared that corporate America was being
outperformed by its German and Japanese peers. American economic performance in the
1990’s and early 2000’s muted the influence of these scholars.
The purpose of this paper is not to say whether stakeholder or shareholder
primacy is better or worse. The obvious should be noted however, that a corporation run
for the benefit of shareholders is more likely to benefit shareholders, while a corporation
run for the benefit of stakeholders such as employees is more likely to benefit
stakeholders, at least in the short run. It is also important to note that neither governance
system is entirely dominated by either norm, and that our narrative is built in part by
making a generalization about two incredibly nuanced systems of corporate governance.

5.4 Independence v. Representation
German boards, reflecting stakeholder norms, are representative in nature, while
American boards are independent. German boards directly represent stakeholder interests
by having stakeholder oversight, while American boards represent shareholder interests
by maintaining independent oversight.
American board independence is a recent phenomenon, birthed out of judicial and
managerial necessity as a response to “preserve managerial autonomy against the
pressure of the market” during the 1980’s hostile takeover explosion. 288 Prior to this
emergence, American corporate norms tended to reflect modern German norms. During
the 1950’s, called the “high-water mark of managerialism” in U.S. corporate governance,
stakeholder capitalism was instituted in practice if not in legislation. 289 Corporate
management felt a responsibility to act in the interest of employees and consumers, and
was largely given free reign in the management of the company. 290 The board, often
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management picked executives or close company advisors such as outside counsel, was
seen as having an “advisory” as opposed to a “monitoring” role.291
The rise of board independence, which was largely a response to the unbridled
free-market capitalism of the “deal-decade” of the 1980’s, is now one of the defining
characteristics of the more neo-liberal shareholder primacy model of corporate
governance in America. The independent board responded to what Gordon described as
the “three-way paradox” of norms promoting shareholder maximization, defense
measures by corporate boards that prevented this shareholder maximization and the high
cost of hostile bids and their associated agency problems. 292 The independent board
resolved this paradox by evaluating management performance based on stock market
prices while simultaneously improving the agency problem by created independent board
voices.
Developing in tandem with board independence has been the heightening of board
monitoring requirements. The Enron collapse highlighted board-monitoring failures.
Heightened independent director relationship and monitoring standards promulgated by
the NYSE and the SEC, along with those imposed by the Court of Chancery, have placed
an even larger burden on independent directors. This newly emergent dual mandate of
enhanced monitoring duties to go with outside, independent advisory duties serves as the
watchman overlooking modern American capitalism.
The German corporate norm of favoring stakeholders over independent directors
is reflective of a different version of capitalism that favors stakeholder input and
managerial expertise over independence. The management boards in Germany, which
have the responsibility of setting corporate strategy, are almost entirely composed of
executive directors with close ties to the corporation. Supervisory boards, which are
responsible for monitoring and may advise on strategy, are overwhelmingly composed of
employees (49%) and other non-independent executives (24%), with only 29% of
directors being truly independent or shareholder nominated. 293 This model favors
management expertise and stakeholder input over independent outsiders. The similarities
in both structure and norms between 1950’s American corporate boards and modern
291
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German boards are striking, and highlight the changing landscape of American
governance ideals.

5.5 Compensation
German and American board compensation structures both have potentially
troubling incentives, but each in a way unique to their own governance systems. German
and American boards also regulate director compensation very differently, further
reflecting governance norms.
In the United States, director compensation is set by the board in consultation with
compensation experts.

294

Board compensation in America is also becoming primarily

incentive based.295 There is some scholarship that suggests incentive pay aligns director
and shareholder interest, even when considering a long investment time horizon and
expenditures such as Research and Development. 296 Other advisory agencies such as
Moody’s argue that incentive pay undermines director independence, creates an
excessive focus on share price and creates incentives for boards to be less vigorous in
regulating earnings materials. 297 In general, governance trends in the United States at
both the state and federal level have been heightening board independence, but director
compensation trends have been moving in the opposite direction, potentially threatening
this independence. If both outside directors and executives face the same compensation
incentives to increase a company’s stock price, the outside directors’ ability to oversee
management, and protect the shareholders, is put into jeopardy.
German compensation of the management board is set by the supervisory board,
but governed by statute. 298 Management board compensation, although set by the
supervisory board, must “bear a reasonable relationship to the duties of such members”,
which has greatly limited compensation freedom of contract and made director
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compensation subject to judicial review.

299

Supervisory board pay is also broadly

governed by statute, but is set at the shareholders meeting.300
Incentive based pay is becoming more prominent amongst German directors, but
because board independence is not prioritized incentive pay does not threaten
independence in the same way as it would on American boards. The supervisory boards
composition of employees and management representatives (who set management board
pay), raises other potential conflicts that might threaten both shareholders and the
company, however. Many have described the so-called Faustian bargain on German
boards between labor and management, where labor gives broad leeway to management
(potentially ignoring their supervisory duties) in exchange for the protection of German
jobs.301 German director compensation structures face the same poor set of incentives: the
supervisory board, comprised of half labor representatives, may be willing to grant
favorable compensation schemes to management in exchange for protection of German
labor interests. Pay incentives on German boards highlight the dark side of stakeholder
capitalism in Germany for shareholders; their interests, far from being equal to
stakeholders such as labor and management, will be subjugated with little recourse
outside of litigation. 302
A recent paper by J. Travis Laster and John Mark Zeberkiewicz describes
blockholder directors in American corporate governance, and is a useful vehicle for
analyzing certain flaws in German compensation practices.
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define a blockholder director as “when one or more directors have been designated by a
particular class or series of stockholders or were appointed at the behest of an insurgent
group” that is then perceived to be “exercising directorial powers for the benefit of a
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subset of the stockholder base.”

304

The authors argue that Delaware law rejects

“constituency directors” that only represent a subset of the shareholder base, and
highlights how fiduciary obligations of Delaware directors require all directors to
“promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”305
Vice Chancellor Laster’s worst fears for Delaware are engrained common practice
in Germany. Blockholder directors need not solely be understood as representing
shareholders, but in the German context also stakeholder directors. Instead of a fiduciary
obligation to act for all shareholders, however, blockholder directors such as labor allied
directors in Germany have the ability to represent labor interests, which stands in stark
contrast with the Delaware board-centric model resting on collective decisionmaking.
Whenever there is a unity of labor and management interests that allow board alliances
between the two, shareholder interests and recourse become subjugated. Without
Delaware style fiduciary duties given to blockholders, there is always a threat that
nebulous “company interests” will really be labor or management interests. The two-tier
board structure as it exists in Germany is a particularly opaque vessel that could allow an
alliance by blockholders for self-enrichment and scandal, and management board
compensation seems a likely location for this plundering.306307
German compensation practices are best considered yet another reflection of
stakeholder primacy on the German board, and Germany’s two tier-structure creates the
potential for abuse by vote-trading between the supervisory and management boards on
compensation, as well as other board practices. Freedom of contract is limited by statute
in Germany, probably out of necessity, because there is no private check on
compensation practices like there is under Delaware law for shareholders. Conversely in
the United States, director compensation practices reflect shareholder primacy norms, but
director independence may be undermined by incentive compensation.
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IV. International Convergence of Board Standards
5.1 International Convergence in Germany
A cross-border diffusion of international governance norms has begun to impact
both governance systems. The German two-tier system now allows more supervisory
board oversight of management, while the American board is increasingly become multitiered in function. 308 These changes reflect growing attempts by both systems to
incorporate strengths of the other. This diffusion is being facilitated by economic
globalization309, the strong external effects of rules set by U.S. equity markets310 and both
shareholder and regulatory pushback for governance improvements. Some might predict
the emergence of an international best practice of governance norms developing as part
of this trend. Further convergence, however, is likely to be tepid at best.
Some scholars have argued that instead of international best practices on
governance norms developing, shareholder pressure will instead lead to a race to the
bottom of minimum standards. 311 Other such as John C. Coffee have worried that
piecemeal implementation of certain governance norms across cultures will be largely
ineffective. 312 Finally, due to differing roles for stakeholders, governance norms
acceptable in one country may never be acceptable in the other. 313 There are strong
cultural reasons, such as codetermination, that would likely prevent certain outcomes like
the rise of truly independent boards in Germany.
Hansmann and R. Kraakman noted “by their nature… [a firm] is strongly
responsive to shareholder interests. [firms] do not, however, necessarily dictate how the
interests of other participants in the firm […] will be accommodated”314. Both scholars
predicted a decline of the two-tier board but also a simultaneous decline in shareholder
primacy and greater stakeholder influence.315 Today, in Germany a trend towards more
shareholder value protection can be observed, but there is little evidence of a shifting
308
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norm in Germany towards shareholder primacy, as evident by the use of a stakeholder
encompassing definition in the GCGC.316 Corporate governance in Germany continues to
structure a company’s managing and supervising tasks in a way that best facilitates the
relationship between managers, board(s), shareholders and other stakeholders.317
Both the German and America board systems have proven similarly efficient in
each of their respective cultural systems.318 Despite the success of the two-tier board in
Germany, many Germany scholars have promoted implementing an optional one-tier
board structure for German corporations.

319

European regulators have already

implemented this choice allowing a SE to choose between either structure. Every German
company has the possibility to change their system to a less codetermined320, smaller onetier board. In the 12 years of its existence only 5 of the 100 biggest German companies
chose the form of an SE in 2012.321 All 5 companies that did, however, chose a dualistic
SE system with management and supervisory board.322

5.2 The “1.5” Tier Board in America
The American board has begun to reflect German two-tier model in function if not
in form. The heightening of monitoring standards on boards following the passage of
SOX has led to the American board increasing in both size and expertise. These
heightened standards have required boards to delegate responsibilities increasingly to
committees, which are growing in number, expertise and responsibility. 323 The audit
committee, for example, is only composed of a small number of independent directors
with expertise in auditing. The board has effectively delegated the entire auditing
316
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supervisory responsibility to only two or three board members. The rise of committees
along with the heightened monitoring standards may dull some of the primary advantages
of the single-tier board by effectively marginalizing all other board members that lack the
specialized knowledge of the committee. 324 This specialization hurts the flow of
information on the board, and blunts one of the primary advantages of the one-tier board.
The rise of executive sessions, which are separate meetings of the independent
directors without the executive directors, is yet another example of the fraying of the onetier board into two or more tiers. Board meetings that are less inclusive of all board
members stymie board cohesion and information flow. In this way, the American board
may be better described as a “1.5” tier rather than a one-tier board. Supervisory duties,
although not legally separate like in the German model, have been heightened and
delegated to the point of constituting something unique, and substantively different than a
unified one-tier board.

V. Conclusion
The one-tier and two-tier board models of the United States and Germany reflect
differing histories, governance norms and national aspirations. Substantial changes over
the past 30 years to the American board has made American boards substantively far
different than German boards, as they increasingly favor independence over
representation and shareholders over stakeholders. In many ways, however, American
boards are procedurally becoming more similar to their German counterparts. The
heightened monitoring standards for boards and the rising importance of committees has
made the one-tier board in America more akin to a multi-tiered board.
In Germany, corporations now have the choice of adopting the one-tier board
model but very few have done so. It is possible that demand from the international
financial markets will force the German system to conform more strongly with the
American board structure, but it remains to be seen if this will be the case. As long as
there is ambiguity over which model performs better, it is unlikely that either nation will
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abandon their board structure and the cultural norms that each structure represents for the
foreseeable future.
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Article.
- Artikel.

-

Art.

Chief Executive Officer.

-

CEO

Chief Financial Officer.

-

CFO

Chief Organization Officer.

-

COO

Chief Legal Officer

-

CLO

Collection of Rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany.
- Entscheidungssammlung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts.

-

BVerfGE

Collection of Rulings of the Federal Court of Justice in Corporate Law.
- Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen.

-

BGHZ

Company limited by shares.
- Aktiengesellschaft.

-

AG

Company with limited liability.
- Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung.

-

GmbH

Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 of 8. October 2001 on the
Statute for a European company, as published in the announcement
of 11. November 2001 (OJEC 2001, L 294/1).
- SE Verordnung.

-

SE-VO

European Court of Justice.
- Europäischer Gerichtshof.

-

EuGH

European limited liability company.
- Societas Europaea.

-

SE

European Union.
- Europäische Union.

-

EU

Federal Constitutional Court of Germany.

-

BVerfG

Association.
- Verein.
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- Bundesverfassungsgericht.
Federal Court of Justice of Germany.
- Bundesgerichtshof.

-

BGH

Federal Financial Supervisory Authority.
- Bundesanstalt für Finanzaufsicht.

-

BaFin

Federal Gazette.
- Bundesanzeiger.

-

BAnz

Federal Law Gazette.
- Bundesgesetzblatt.

-

BGBl.

For Example.
- Zum Beispiel.

-

i.e.

-

DGCL

Foundation.
- Stiftung.
Delaware General Corporation Law.
General Meeting.
- Hauptversammlung.
German Act on Codetermination in the Coal, Iron and Steel Industry, as published in a revised version (BGBl. III, 801-2), last amended by Art.
5 of the Law of 24. April 2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 642).
- Montan Mitbestimmungsgesetz.

MontanMitbestG

German Banking Act, as published on 9. September 1998 (BGBl. 1998,
I, 2776), last amended by Art. 16 of the Law of20. November 2015
(BGBl. 2015, I, 2029).
- Gesetz über das Kreditwesen.

-

KWG

German Codetermination Act, as published on 4. May 1976 (BGBl.
1976, I, 1153), last amended by Art. 7 of the Law of 24. April 2015
(BGBl. 2015, I, 642).
- Mitbestimmungsgesetz.

-

MitbestG

German Corporate Governance Code, last amended on 5. May 2015,
published in the announcement of 12. June 2015 (Banz., AT B1).

-

GCGC
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- Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex.
German Limited Liability Companies Act, as published in a revised
version (BGBl. III, 4123-1), last amended by Art. 5 of the Law of 22.
December 2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 2565).
- GmbH Gesetz.

-

GmbHG

German One-Third Participation Act, as published on 18. May 2004
(BGBl. 2004, I, 974), last amended by Art. 8 of the Law of 25. April
2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 642).
- Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz.

-

DrittelbG

German SE Implementation Act, as published in the announcement of
22. December 2004 (BGBl. 2004, I, 3675), last amended by Art. 14 of
the Law of 24. April 2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 642).
- SE-Ausführungsgesetz.

-

SEAG

German Stock Corporation Act, as published on 6. September 1965
(BGBl. 1965, I, 1089), last amended by Art. 14 of the Law of 24. April
2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 642).
- Aktiengesetz.

-

AktG

Higher Regional Court in Berlin.
- Kammergericht Berlin.

-

KG Berlin

Higher Regional Court in Germany.
- Oberlandesgericht.

-

OLG

Human Resources.

-

HR

Mutual insurance organization.
- Versicherungsverein auf Gegenseitigkeit.

-

VVaG

National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations.

-

NASDAQ

New York Stock Exchange.

-

NSYE

Limited company.
- Kapitalgesellschaft.
Management board.
- Vorstand.
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Number.
- Nummer.

-

No.

Official Journal of the European Union.
- Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union.

-

OJEC

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung.

-

OECD

Paragraph.
- Absatz.
Partnership limited by shares.
- Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien.

-

Para.

-

KGaA

Registered cooperative society.
- Eingetragene Genossenschaft.

-

eG

Sarbanes-Oxley.

-

SOX

Securities Exchange Commission.

-

SEC

Sentence.
- Satz.

-

Sent.

Subparagraph.
- Unterabsatz.

-

Subpara.

United States.
- Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika.

-

U.S.

German Insurance Supervision Act as published on 1. April 2015
(BGBl. 2015, I, 434), last amended by Art. 3 No.1 of the Law of 21.
December 2015 (BGBl. 2015, I, 2553).
- Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz.

-

VAG

Partnership.
- Personengesellschaft.
Recital.
- Randnummer.

Supervisory board.
- Aufsichtsrat.
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